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Abstract
Standard matching models of unemployment assume that workers and
job ￿ows are identical. This is in stark contrast to empirical evidence that
job ￿ows in fact only account for a fraction of worker ￿ows, that unem-
ployment exits only account for a fraction of hires and that these fractions
vary over the cycle. In this paper, we develop and calibrate a model based
on the Mortensen and Pissarides approach but that emphasises this issue.
We show that this matters - that it has very diﬀerent implications for our
view of unemployment dynamics.
The key features of our model relate to the search options of the worker,
a n dt h ej o bc r e a t i o nd e c i s i o nb y￿rms. We allow workers to search whilst
employed, and ￿rms to re-advertise jobs that have been quit from. This
l e a d su st ou s ead i ﬀerent job creation process, whereby potential va-
cancies, or job ￿ideas￿, arise at a ￿nite rate per period over a range of
idiosyncratic productivities. In the standard setting, there is an unlim-
ited supply of potential vacancies at the top idiosyncratic productivity.
The main results are as follows. First, the presence of on-the-job search
has a substantial impact on labour market equilibrium, whereby equilib-
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1rium unemployment is lower and exhibits a higher turnover rate. On-the-
job search renders the unemployment in￿ow rate more sensitive to the
cycle: in all cases, the in￿ow rate is found to be more cyclically sensitive
than the out￿ow rate, suggesting that most unemployment dynamics oc-
cur through this channel. This con￿rms empirical results for Great Britain
(Burgess and Turon (2005)).
Second, our model oﬀers some insight into a (two-way) relationship be-
tween job-to-job ￿ows, which drives the diﬀerence between worker and job
￿ows, and the extent of wage dispersion. More wage dispersion increases
the incentive to search on-the-job and more on-the-job search widens the
range of viable productivities and leads to lower wages at the bottom of
the wage distribution, thereby increasing wage dispersion.
Third, changes in the model￿s exogenous parameters impact unemploy-
ment to a considerable degree by changing the level of employed job search.
Keywords: Unemployment, on-the-job search, worker ￿ows, job ￿ows,
matching.
JEL classi￿cation: J64.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The search and matching framework has been widely used to analyse unem-
ployment1. A great deal of progress has been made in recent years linking the
initial focus on worker ￿ows (unemployment exits) to the newer literature on
job ￿ows (job creation and destruction)2. Calibrated versions of these mod-
els ￿t reasonably well with some labour market facts. However, there is one
gross fact that con￿i c t sw i t ht h em o d e l s ,a n di st h ef o c u so ft h i sp a p e r . T h i s
is the relationship between worker ￿ows and job ￿ows. In stark contrast to
the models￿ predictions, job ￿ows in fact only account for a fraction of worker
￿ows, and unemployment exits only account for a fraction of hires. Further-
more, these fractions vary over the cycle3. These facts are key to understanding
unemployment dynamics and the operation of the labour market, and need to be
incorporated in the modelling process. The process driving a wedge between job
and worker ￿ows (and between unemployment exits and hires) is workers mov-
ing directly from one job to another4. In this paper, we develop and calibrate
a model based on the Mortensen and Pissarides approach but that emphasises
this issue. We show that this matters - that it has diﬀerent implications for our
view of unemployment dynamics.
1See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) for the seminal work in this area, and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999a and 1999b) for surveys of this literature.
2Allowing for endogenous job destruction enhances the ability of the framework to assess
the role of labour market frictions and the propagation of productivity shocks, see for example
Merz (1999), den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
3With data for Maryland, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) ￿nd that only 54% of worker
reallocation is accounted for by job reallocation, and that the two types of reallocation exhibit
diﬀerent behaviour over the business cycle. With data for several European countries, Burda
and Wyplosz (1994) also found that job ￿ows are countercyclical whereas worker ￿ows are
procyclical.
4Job-to-job ￿ows have been documented to account for about 50% of total separations
in the UK and the US and about 25% in Italy (Contini and Revelli (1997, p.256)) and to
be sensitive to the business cycle and labour market institutions (Burgess, Lane and Stevens
(2000), Boeri (1999)).
3The key features of our model that allow us to explain the dynamics facts
of the labour market relate to the search options of the worker, and the job
creation decision by ￿rms. The vast majority of this literature assumes that
job search can only be undertaken by the unemployed. Notable exceptions are
Mortensen (1994) and Pissarides (2000)5. But these, along with other models,
make assumptions that imply that jobs left vacant by workers quitting or retiring
are destroyed. This necessarily implies that total job destruction equals total
separations, and the model loses the capability to analyse them separately. Our
approach allows workers to search whilst employed, and ￿rms to re-advertise
jobs that have been quit from. We produce a model of unemployment that
is consistent with the stylised facts noted above. We calibrate the model and
assess the response to various labour market shocks, emphasising the role of
employed job search.
Our model is closest to the one by Pissarides (2000, Chapter 4). Firms
are heterogenous and the value of their output is decomposed in terms of a
common aggregate component and an idiosyncratic component which is subject
to shocks. When the idiosyncratic productivity falls below some endogenously
determined threshold, the ￿rm destroys the job6. Workers in jobs with idio-
syncratic productivity below some other endogenous threshold decide to search
on-the-job. When they are successful and quit, the ￿rm can re-advertise the
vacant job at the same level of productivity and opt do to so in most cases.
This is more realistic than the implication of the standard model that the job is
5Models with on-the-job search have also been developed to explain wage dispersion (Bur-
dett and Mortensen (1998), Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999), Galindo-Rueda
(2002)).
6Pissarides (1994), Shimer (2003) and Eriksson and Gottfries (2002) also set up unem-
ployment models with on-the-job search but keep job destruction exogenous.
4always destroyed after a quit or a retirement. This requires us to use a diﬀerent
job creation process, whereby potential vacancies, or job ￿ideas￿, arise at a ￿nite
rate per period over a range of idiosyncratic productivities. In the standard set-
ting, there is an unlimited supply of potential vacancies at the top idiosyncratic
productivity and vacancies are created until the exhaustion of rents. In our
setting, the marginal created vacancy makes zero pro￿t but all other vacancies
are pro￿table7. Vacancies are hence heterogenous. The model does not have
a closed form solution, so we use a calibrated version to simulate the impact
of on-the-job search on unemployment equilibrium. As Pissarides (2000), we
￿nd that more on-the-job search leads to a lower unemployment in￿ow rate and
a slightly higher matching probability for workers. We are also able to assess
the role of on-the-job search in the propagation of shocks to the economy or in
relation to the role of institutions such as unemployment bene￿t.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, the presence of on-
the-job search has a substantial impact on labour market equilibrium, whereby
equilibrium unemployment is lower and exhibits a higher turnover rate. On-the-
job search renders the unemployment in￿ow rate more sensitive to the cycle: in
all cases, the in￿ow rate is found to be more cyclically sensitive than the out￿ow
rate, suggesting that most unemployment dynamics occur through this channel.
This con￿rms empirical results for Great Britain (Burgess and Turon, 2005).
Researchers have come to see worker ￿ows and job ￿ows as key elements
of the operation of labour markets. This model is the ￿rst in the now ubiqui-
7As opposed to vacancies in the standard model which are all posted at the maximum
productivity and all make zero pro￿t. As a result, in the standard model, there is a unique
potential wage rate at the match for all job seekers, i.e. no wage distribution at the time of
the match.
5tous matching approach to be able to analyse them separately. Other matching
models either allow no employed job search and so no job-to-job ￿ows, or make
a s s u m p t i o n si m p l y i n gn ow o r k e rc h u r n i n g￿b o t ho ft h e s er o u t e sy i e l dt h er e -
sult that worker and job ￿ows are identical. This stands in stark contrast to
the facts assembled over recent years using microdata on ￿rms, on workers and
using linked ￿rm-worker data. The facts show that worker ￿ows and job ￿ows
are very diﬀerent in magnitude, and also very diﬀerent in terms of their cyclical
behaviour. It is clearly important for the workhorse model of labour market
analysis to be able to accommodate these facts, and this is what the model in
this paper accomplishes. We suggest that the role of employed job search is po-
tentially important in understanding the diﬀerences in labour markets between
diﬀerent countries. We return to this in the Conclusion.
Third, our model oﬀers some insight into a reciprocal relationship between
job-to-job ￿ows, which drives the diﬀerence between worker and job ￿ows, and
the extent of wage dispersion. More wage dispersion increases the incentive
to search on-the-job for workers in jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Conversely, on-the-job search renders some jobs viable at the bottom of the wage
distribution that would not be so otherwise8. This is because workers who search
on-the-job receive a lower wage than they would if they did not search as they
share with the ￿rm the expected surplus from their search. Some jobs with low
idiosyncratic productivity are hence viable when on-the-job search is allowed,
that were not so without on-the-job search. To sum up, with on-the-job search,
the range of viable idiosyncratic productivities is extended downwards and ￿rms
8The fact that employed job search supports greater wage dispersion is not a new result,
but our models allows us to emphasise the reciprocal relationship between the two.
6with idiosyncratic productivities towards the bottom of the distribution oﬀer
lower wages because they are aware that their employees search on-the-job. So
wage dispersion is increased. This in turn supports more job-to-job ￿ows and a
bigger diﬀerence between job ￿ows and worker ￿o w s .T h u st h ed e g r e eo fw a g e
dispersion is linked to the nature of unemployment dynamics.
The calibrated version of our model matches empirical facts well: unemploy-
ment ￿ows are countercyclical, job ￿ows are countercyclical and worker ￿ows
are procyclical. It hence reconciles the diﬀerent behaviours over the business
cycle of job ￿ows and worker ￿ows.
We derive the model in the next section and present the calibration and the
results in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
Our model builds on the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework9, but diﬀers
from it with respect to job search and job creation. These changes are necessary
t oy i e l dam o d e lw i t hj o b - t o - j o b￿ows and a distinction between job ￿ows (job
creation and job destruction) and worker ￿ows (hires and separations). First,
we incorporate on-the-job search, with an endogenous fraction of the employed
￿nding it worthwhile to search. This is clearly necessary to allow job-to-job
￿ows. Second, we allow for heterogeneous vacancy creation and a ￿nite (rather
than in￿nite) supply rate of potential new jobs per period. This is necessary to
allow worker ￿ows and job ￿ows to be diﬀerent. If all jobs that workers quit
from were destroyed (as in the standard set-up), total separations would equal
9See Pissarides (2000) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a) for the derivation of the original
model.
7total job destruction, so we need to allow some of those jobs to be re-advertised
rather than destroyed. If all new vacancies were created at the highest idio-
syncratic productivity, it would never be optimal to re-advertise an on-going
job with a lower productivity. Therefore we assume heterogeneous vacancy cre-
ation. If there were an in￿nite supply of potential jobs ("ideas") per period,
￿rms would reject all but the highest idiosyncratic productivity ideas and again
there would be no re-advertisement. So we also assume a ￿nite supply of po-
tential jobs. Given these assumptions, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to maintain and
re-advertise an endogenous fraction of jobs that workers quit from. This allows
us to explore diﬀerent components of the dynamics of the labour markets, for
example, the diﬀerent response of job ￿ows and worker ￿ows to shocks, the
nature of unemployment dynamics and the the full consequences of on-the-job
search.
As one of our aims is to set up a model of unemployment with more realistic
worker ￿ows, we also introduce ￿ows in and out of the labour force. In Britain,
the ￿ow of entrants/re-entrants to the labour market represents half the in￿ow
into unemployment. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001)a n a l y s et h e s e￿ows in more
depth, but without considering on-the-job search10.I no u rm o d e l ,t h e￿ows in
and out of the labour force are (exogenous) constant fractions of the stock of
the employed. The labour force in￿ow represents new entrants coming from
education and re-entrants coming back after a career break. All labour force
entries ￿ow into unemployment. The labour market, through the matching
mechanism, has to ￿process￿ these workers before they ￿nd a match. The labour
10An interesting extension of both models would include endogenous on-the-job search and
labour force entries and exits as both features are shown to aﬀect unemployment dynamics.
8force out￿ow represents retirements and individuals starting a career breaks.
For simplicity, all labour force exits occur from the state of employment. As
documented by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) both these labour force ￿ows occur
in fact to and from both states of employment and unemployment, in cyclically
sensitive proportions. Their evidence, however, supports that total labour force
￿ows are roughly constant over the cycle.
2.1 Workers
We denote labour market tightness by θ, and an unemployed searcher￿s matching
probability as θq(θ); these are fully de￿n e dbe l o w .W ea s s u m et h a te m p l o y e dj o b
seekers have a matching probability equal to a times the matching probability
of unemployed job searchers. The parameter a captures the relative search
eﬀectiveness of employed job seekers and could in principle be greater or less
than 1. The per-period cost of employed job search is denoted k.
Once in a match, the value of the output has a common aggregate com-
ponent, p, and an idiosyncratic component,  . The latter is subject to shocks
arriving at rate λ per unit time, discussed below. Following Jovanovic (1979), we
assume that the job match is an experience good, so the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity is unknown to the worker at the time of the match and is only discovered
once she takes the job. It is not possible for ￿rms advertising vacant jobs with a
high productivity to signal it to job seekers because they cannot commit to the
promised wage once the worker is employed (because of wage renegotiation). If
the idiosyncratic productivity is below an endogenous threshold S the worker
will ￿nd it worthwhile to continue search on the job. Because   is unknown ex
ante, employed job seekers sample all the available vacancies, and accept all
9oﬀers rather than just those better than their current match. Therefore, neither
the matching probability (aθq (θ)) nor the expected value of employment in the
next job depend on the value of   in their current job. The Bellman equations
for employed workers are as follows: Eo ( ) when the worker is searching on the
job, En ( ) when she is not:
rEo ( )=wo ( )+l(U − Eo ( )) + aθq (θ)
•Z σ
T






E(x).dF(x)+U.F(R) − Eo ( )
‚
rEn ( )=wn ( )+l(U − En ( )) + λ
•Z σ
R
E(x).dF(x)+U.F(R) − Eo ( )
‚
(2)
where r is the discount rate. Taking Eo( ),t h e￿rst term on the right-hand side
is the current wage, depending on idiosyncratic productivity as explained below;
the second term represents retirement, and the third and fourth terms are the
probability of receiving an oﬀer multiplied by its expected value minus search
cost. Jobs are created for   above T, the endogenous job creation threshold,
generating job oﬀers. The ￿nal term re￿ects the impact of the evolution of the
idiosyncratic term: shocks arrive at rate λ, and shocks between an endogenous
threshold R and σ lead to renegotiation of the wage and so a diﬀerent value of E,
while shocks pushing   below R lead to the job being destroyed and the worker
￿o w i n gi n t ou n e m p l o y m e n t 11.T h ev a l u eo fEo( ) has the same structure, ob-
viously omitting the value and the cost of search. Note that the distribution of
idiosyncratic productivities   in vacant jobs, FV (.),i sd i ﬀerent from the distri-
bution of   following an idiosyncratic shock, F(.). Reasons for this are detailed
below and the derivation of the various density functions is given in Appendix
11Note that we assume that the time unit is such that more than one event - a job oﬀer or
an idiosyncratic shock - cannot occur at the same time.
10A.
The Bellman equation for unemployed workers is:
rU = b + θq(θ)
￿Z σ
T
E(x).dFV (x) − U
¶
(3)
where b is the per-period sum of the unemployment bene￿t and the value of
leisure, net of job search costs. With probability θq(θ) the unemployed receive
an employment oﬀer which they accept. We assume that the out-of-the-labour-
force state value also equals U. The value of employment in the marginal job,
Eo(T), is greater than the value of unemployment U as the surplus at T is
positive.
2.2 Firms
Potential new ￿ideas￿ for jobs are born at a rate of jcr per period and their value
is distributed over the range (−σ;σ) according to a cumulative distribution
function F( ). The value of the output produced by ￿r m si sc o m p o s e do ft w o
parts: the aggregate component, p and the idiosyncratic value of the idea,  .
When   is above an endogenous threshold T it is worthwhile opening a vacancy.
The value of   is subject to idiosyncratic shocks occurring at rate λ;t h ep o s t -
shock distribution of   is also F( ). If the post-shock idiosyncratic productivity
falls below an endogenous threshold R, the job is destroyed and the worker ￿ows
into unemployment; we show that R<T.
The wage is negotiated at the time of matching and is re-negotiated after
either an idiosyncratic shock or an aggregate shock. The ￿rm knows that the
worker will search if the idiosyncratic productivity is below S, and this in￿uences
11the wage setting process in a way described below (see section 2.3). Because
of the diﬀerent wage function and because of the diﬀerent probability of the
worker leaving the job, the value of a ￿lled job with a non-searching worker, Jn,
(that is,   in the range (S;σ)), is diﬀerent from the value of a ￿lled job with an
on-the-job seeker, Jo(  in the range (T;S)).
The value functions for ￿l l e dj o b sd e p e n do nt h ep r i c eo fo u t p u t ,t h ew a g e ,
the impact of idiosyncratic shocks and the cost of worker turnover. For values
of   in the interval (T;S),t h e￿rm expects the job to become vacant again
with probability aθq (θ) (the matching probability for employed workers). It
also expects the worker to leave the labour force with probability l12.W h e n
the job becomes vacant it keeps its level of idiosyncratic productivity  , because
this de￿nes the job and is not attached to the worker or the worker-job match.
Idiosyncratic shocks change the value of the job; shocks pushing   below R
destroy the job (ie. J =0 ). The Bellman equations for ￿lled jobs, Jo ( ) (Jn ( )
respectively) when the worker is (respectively is not) searching on the job, are:




J(x).dF(x) − Jo ( )
‚
(4)




J(x).dF(x) − Jn ( )
‚
(5)
The wage negotiated with a worker continuing job search, wo ( ), will be diﬀerent
from the wage negotiated with a worker who stops searching, wn ( ).W a g e
12Note that in case of retirement or quit to another job, the ￿rm plans to re-advertise the
job. So separations and job destruction are diﬀerent and labour force exits are not a form of
exogenous job destruction: most jobs left by a retiree are re-advertised.
12d e t e r m i n a t i o ni sd e t a i l e di ns e c t i o n2 . 3 .W h e t h e raw o r k e rs e a r c h e so nt h ej o bo r
not does not depend on the worker herself but on the idiosyncratic productivity
of the job,  . All workers employed in jobs with   less than S will be looking
for another job, whilst no worker employed in a job with   more than S will be
doing so.
The value of a vacancy will also have a diﬀerent expression when   is in the
range (T;S), denoted Vo,f r o mw h e n  is in the range (S;σ), denoted Vn.Vacant
jobs have a probability q(θ) of being matched with a job searcher, determined by
the matching function (see section 2.4). Since we assume that   is unobserved to
the worker until the match actually takes place and that no signalling can take
place, all vacant jobs have the same probability of being matched, irrespective
of their idiosyncratic productivity  . Note that the idiosyncratic value of vacant
jobs is also subject to shocks. The Bellman equations for vacant jobs are:
rVo( )=−c + q(θ)(Jo ( ) − Vo ( )) + λ
•Z σ
T
V (x).dF(x) − Vo ( )
‚
(6)
rVn ( )=−c + q(θ)(Jn ( ) − Vn ( )) + λ
•Z σ
T
V (x).dF(x) − Vn ( )
‚
(7)
where c is the per-period cost of opening a vacancy. As in the standard model,
vacant jobs are created until rents are exhausted. What is diﬀerent here is that
all vacancies but the marginal one will make a positive pro￿t13.T h ej o bc r e a t i o n
13In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), all new jobs were created at the top idiosyncratic
productivity - for which the pro￿ts from a vacancy is zero. Here, jobs are created over a
range of idiosyncratic productivities (T;σ) and the pro￿ts from a vacancy are zero at T and
positive over the rest of the range. In den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001, pp. 8-10), new
matches are ￿accepted￿ by worker and ￿rm as long as the relationship-speci￿c productivity is
greater than some threshold for which the joint surplus of the match is zero. Blanchard and
Diamond (1989, p.9) already suggested that, in the short run, the pro￿ts from a vacancy were
not necessarily zero.
13threshold is determined as:
Vo (T)=0 (8)
Filled jobs with idiosyncratic productivities in the range (T;S) are quit from
and re-advertised at a rate (l + aθq (θ)) whereas ￿lled jobs with idiosyncratic
productivities in the range (S;σ) are quit from and re-advertised at a rate l;
￿lled jobs with   in the range (R;T) are quit from at rate (l + aθq (θ)) but once
quit from are destroyed. Vacant jobs are all matched at the same rate, q(θ).T h e
distribution of idiosyncratic productivity  will hence be diﬀerent between vacant
jobs FV (.) and ￿lled jobs FE(.). It is one of the model parameters. Although
the job-to-job quit rate and the retirement rate are of similar magnitude over
the whole employment stock, the retirement rate l is much lower than the quit
rate aθq (θ) for a given idiosyncratic productivities (by a factor 30 in our base
calibration). This is because workers retire from the whole employment stock
whereas they quit from only a small fraction of it (6% in our base calibration).
So the distribution of   in vacant jobs FV (.) is highly concentrated in the interval
(T;S) compared to the distribution of ￿lled jobs FE(.). In our base calibration,
about half the vacancy stock is in this range against 6% of the employment
stock. The calculation of the cumulative distribution functions FV (.) and FE(.)
is detailed in Appendix A. The fact that the model implies these three diﬀerent
distributions instead of just one in the standard setting prevents us from having
a simple closed form solution to our model.
142.3 Surplus and wage bargaining
The wage rate is determined by Nash bargaining between worker and ￿rm, as
in the Mortensen-Pissarides framework14. However, in their framework all new
matches are formed at the maximum idiosyncratic productivity, leading to a
single wage rate at the match. In our setup, new matches occur over a range
of idiosyncratic productivities, namely (T;σ). The idiosyncratic productivity
of a job,  , is unknown to the worker at the time of the match, and is only re-
vealed when she starts in the job. As mentioned, the wage level is renegotiated
between the worker and the ￿rm following each shock to  ,s ot h a ti ta l w a y s
shares the match surplus between the two parties according to their bargaining
power. Before the match actually occurs, there is no wage oﬀer apart from a
knowledge of this renegotiation rule. The worker always ￿nds it worthwhile to
take up the job oﬀer: for unemployed searchers because Eo(T) is greater than
U, and for employed job seekers because necessarily the expected value of alter-
native employment net of search costs is greater than the value of her current
employment (otherwise she would not search). It may be that the employed
job searcher is unlucky when she ￿nds a new job in that she experiences a wage
drop15, but her expected returns to search were still positive ex ante.
From the equations above, we see that the surplus from a match between a
vacant job and a job seeker will have a diﬀerent expression for jobs in which the
14There has been a growing literature on alternative models of wage determination over
the past decade, particularly models with wage-posting games (see Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999b) for a survey). Here, wage dispersion is obtained with Nash bargaining wage determi-
nation.
15Nickell (2002, Table 7, p.21) reports that over 10% of job movers with no intervening
spell of unemployment experience a wage drop of over 10 % ,w i t hd a t ao nB r i t i s hm e no v e r
the period 1982-1996.
15worker carries on searching and in jobs where the worker stops searching:
So( )=Jo ( ) − Vo ( )+Eo ( ) − U (9)
Sn ( )=Jn ( ) − Vn ( )+En ( ) − U (10)
Because wage negotiation occurs once the worker is in the job, we assume that
the worker￿s outside option is unemployment in both cases. As argued below, it
is never optimal for a ￿rm to attempt to retain a worker with an outside oﬀer
by making a counter-oﬀer. The potential outside oﬀer hence never becomes a
new outside option for the worker in the wage baragining process as it would in
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). A worker who has quit her previous job does
not have the option to go back to it, hence employed and unemployed job seekers
are oﬀered the same wage rates when hired. Pissarides (1994, p.465) and Shimer
(2004, p.5) make the same assumption, based on the impossibility of returning to
the old employer for a worker who quits a job and on the impossibility to commit
to a long-term contract to attract an employed worker for the prospective ￿rm.
So the above surplus expressions apply to matches between a vacant job and
either an unemployed or an employed job seeker.
The two wage rates wo( ) and wn ( ) resulting from the Nash bargaining
will satisfy the following conditions:
β (Jo ( ) − Vo ( )) = (1 − β)(Eo ( ) − U) (11)
β (Jn ( ) − Vn ( )) = (1 − β)(En ( ) − U) (12)
where β is the worker￿s share of the surplus. Shimer (2004) shows that, in his
model of on-the-job search, surplus sharing is not generally equivalent to the
16Nash solution. In our setting, however, because we assume   to be unobserved
before an oﬀer is accepted, neither the quit rate nor the expected value of
employment in the next job for employed job seekers depend on the level of
their current wage. It follows that, for employed job seekers, raising wo by
∆wo will increase the worker￿s side of the surplus by [r + l + aθq(θ)+λ].∆wo
and lower the ￿rm￿s side of the surplus by the same amount. The Nash solution
will hence coincide with the surplus-sharing rule, in our context.
In jobs with low idiosyncratic productivity, there are expected bene￿ts to
job search for the worker as the expected value of a future job is high enough
compared to the value of the current job to more than oﬀset the search costs
k.F o r t h e ￿rm, employed job search represents a cost as it expects to have
to re-advertise the vacancy in the near future, and the value of a vacant job is
always lower than the value of the ￿lled job for the same productivity. These
two facts imply that the wage rate for workers engaged in on-the-job search,
wo ( ), is lower than the wage rate of non-searching workers, wn ( ),o v e rt h e
range of productivities where workers do decide to search on-the-job, (T;S).
Firms with idiosyncratic productivities in the range (T;S) are aware that
the workers they hire engage in on-the-job search. They are not tempted to stop
t h e mf r o md o i n gs ob yo ﬀering them a higher wage because their search creates
an expected bene￿t, that they enjoy a share of, through the Nash bargaining
wage determination. In other words, as the worker expects to ￿nd a better job,
the value of which more than oﬀsets the search costs, she is better oﬀ searching.
Some of this bene￿t from search (but not all) is taken away from her in the wage
determination as she gets paid a lower wage than she would have, had she not
17searched on the job. The ￿rm anticipates having to pay advertising costs when
the worker quits, so would be worse oﬀ if the search decision did not aﬀect
the wage rate. However, because the Nash bargaining leads to a lower wage
when the worker searches on the job, the ￿rm is in fact better oﬀ if the worker
does search as the wage diﬀerence more than oﬀsets the anticipated advertising
costs16.F u r t h e r m o r e ,￿rms cannot aﬀo r dt or e t a i nw o r k e r sw h oh a v ea no u t s i d e
oﬀer in hand: as the new job￿s   is unobserved until the worker actually starts
in the new job, the minimum wage that the old ￿rm would have to pay to retain
the worker is a wage that matches the expected wage EV {w} that the worker
anticipates. It turns out that, in all our simulations, even the ￿rm with the
highest productivity in the range where workers engage in on-the-job search
(  = S)c a n n o ta ﬀord to oﬀer such a wage, i.e. re-opening a vacancy is more
pro￿table than retaining the worker with a wage oﬀer of EV {w}.
Firm heterogeneity, embodied in the variance of  , and labour market fric-
tions, embodied by the matching function, lead to some wage dispersion17.T h i s
dispersion is an incentive for some workers paid at the lower end of the wage
distribution to engage in on-the-job search. On-the-job search in turn leads to in-
creased wage dispersion for the following two reasons. First, as these employed
job seekers share the expected bene￿t from their search with their employer
16Shimer (2004) argues that surplus sharing may be ineﬃcient as, in some cases, the ￿rm is
better oﬀ raising the wage in order to reduce quitting. This can occur in his model of on-the-
job search where the quitting probability decreases continuously as the wage rate increases.
In our context, however, the quitting probability is either 0 or aθq(θ). The minimum wage
that the ￿rm would have to pay to stop the worker from searching is wn(S).H o w e v e r ,i nt h e
range of productivities (R;S),t h e￿rm is better oﬀ paying wo( ) and let the worker search on
the job. So it will not attempt to discourage the worker to search.
17Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998), there are a number of models of equilibrium
wage dispersion with wage-posting ￿rms. For example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) present
a search model where both workers and ￿rms are heterogenous. They estimate that worker
heterogeneity contributes 0 to 40% of the wage variance, ￿rm heterogeneity 10t o5 0 %a n d
labour market frictions about 50%.
18through the wage bargaining, they are paid less than if on-the-job search did
not take place. So wages at the low end of the distribution are lower when
on-the-job search occurs. Also, because ￿rms pay lower wages, they ￿nd that
more job ￿ideas￿ are viable and the job creation and job destruction thresholds,
T and R, are lower than without on-the-job search. There is hence a two-way
causal relationship between wage dispersion and on-the-job search.
2.4 Equilibrium
Matches between searching workers and vacant jobs occur at a rate determined
by the matching function, which we assume to exhibit constant returns to scale.
The pool of job searchers comprises all the unemployed job seekers, u,plus the
employed workers engaged in on-the-job search, oj counted in terms of eﬃciency
units (a is the relative matching eﬃciency of employed job seekers compared to
unemployed job seekers):
Number of matches = ξ.(u + a • oj)
(1−α) vα (13)
where ξ is the matching eﬃciency, α the matching elasticity with respect to












The labour force is assumed constant and normalised to 1,s ow eh a v et h e
following identity between the stocks of employed e and unemployed u:
e + u =1 (17)
The equations that determine the model equilibrium are the job creation
condition (18), the job destruction condition (19) and the on-the-job search
threshold condition (20) as well as the ￿ow equations for ￿lled jobs and vacant




The value of R is less than T because the value of a ￿lled job is positive at T and
the function Jo(.) is increasing. Hence, in the interval (R;T),j o b ss u r v i v eb u t
would not be re-advertised if the worker came to quit or retire. In this interval,
workers engage in on-the-job search. S is the idiosyncratic productivity at which
both workers and ￿rms are indiﬀerent between the worker continuing or stopping
search.
The derivation of the model is given in Appendix A.
203R e s u l t s
We now look at a calibrated version of the model and examine the impact of
on-the job search, the business cycle and various parameters on its outcome.
In section 3.1 we calibrate the model to obtain a solution that mirrors reality
in terms of the sizes of the various stocks and ￿ows in the labour market in
Britain. In section 3.2 we simulate the impact of the presence of on-the-job
search on the unemployment rate, ￿ows and wages. We con￿rm Pissarides￿
(2000) ￿ndings for the impact on the unemployment rate. We then turn to the
main results on the dynamics: in section 3.3, we analyse cyclical sensitivities of
the unemployment rate and ￿ows by comparing diﬀerent stages of the business
cycle, with and without on-the-job search. Next, in section 3.4, we exploit our
ability to analyse job and worker ￿ows separately and show that the sizes and
cyclical sensitivities of job ￿ows and worker ￿ows predicted by our model are
consistent with empirical evidence. The discrepancy between job and worker
￿ows, driven by job-to-job ￿ows and labour force ￿ows, is very sensitive to the
cycle. The cyclical sensitivity of job-to-job ￿ows increases the sensitivity of wage
dispersion to the cycle (and is reinforced by it). Finally, the impacts of a change
in unemployment bene￿t, and the relative matching eﬃciency of on-the-job are
examined in section 3.5.
3.1 Calibration
The targets for the calibration process are an unemployment rate of 9%, an
unemployment in￿ow rate of 4% of the labour force18, matching probabilities
18These values were chosen to match data from Great Britain (NOMIS and Burgess and
Turon, 2000).
21of 0.40 for job seekers and 0.90 for vacant jobs. We also attempt to match the
evidence (for example Burgess, 1993) that half the new hires come from the
ranks of the employed and that 5 to 8% of the employed engage in job search
whilst employed (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994), so we need to calibrate the
relative matching eﬃciency of employed job seekers, a, in the range 1.1 to 1.8.
We assume the distribution F(.) to be uniform over the range (−σ;σ)19.T h e
other parameters are as follows: we think of the unit time period to be a quarter
and use a discount rate r of 0.01; the bargaining parameter β i ss e ta t0 . 5 ,a n d
this sets α t ot h es a m ev a l u et of u l ￿ll the Hosios (1990) condition; we set b
at 0.8, l at 0.02, matching eﬃciency ξ at 0.6, the arrival rate of idiosyncratic
shocks, λ at 0.15 (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) use a value of 0.08 for λ.O u r
chosen value implies an expected duration of 7 quarters between shocks to the
idiosyncratic productivity and, together with our calibration of the threshold
R, gives an endogenous job destruction rate of 2% which matches British data).
The values of p and σ are normalised to unity, and the cost of on-the-job search,
k,t o0 . 1. Given these values, we adjust c, a,a n djcr from plausible starting
values to get close to the targets.
A summary of all parameter values for the base case is shown in Table 1.
With these parameter values we obtain a labour market tightness θ of 0.4720
and matching probabilities of 0.41 and 0.87 for workers and vacancies respec-
tively. The resulting stocks of unemployed and employed job seekers are re-
spectively 0.088 and 0.063, while the stock of vacant jobs is 0.092. The unem-
ployment in￿ow rate is 0.04. The average productivity is 1.28, so the average
19The distributions of   over vacancies and ￿lled jobs are derived in the Appendix.
20This value of the tightness is implied by our target values for the workers￿ and jobs￿
matching probabilities.
22Table 1: Parameter values
discount rate r 0.01
worker￿s bargaining power β 0.5
unemployment income b 0.8
retirement/birth rate l 0.02
advertising costs c 0.465
matching eﬃciency ξ 0.6
idiosyncratic shock arrival rate λ 0.15
matching elasticity w.r.t vacancies α 0.5
(genuine) job creation rate jcr 0.055
on-the-job search costs k 0.1
aggregate component of productivity p 1
variance of idiosyncratic shock σ 1
employed seekers￿ relative eﬃciency a 1.71
replacement ratio (b/w)i s6 3 % .T h ev a l u eo fa chosen for our base case, 1.71,
is broadly consistent with ￿ndings by Blau and Robins (1990): with data from
the United States, they ￿nd that employed job seekers enjoy on average 0.30
job oﬀers per week, whereas the ￿gure for unemployed job seekers is only 0.18.
Eriksson and Gottfries (2002) perform some simulations of their model and
obtain values of a of 1. 7f o rt h eU Sa n d4f o rF r a n c ea n dG e r m a n y .
3.2 Impact of on-the-job search
We get at the role of on-the-job search in two ways. First, we look at marginal
changes by varying the cost of on-the-job search, k. Second, we simulate the
model with no on-the-job search (with a setting similar to the above, but where
on-the-job search is not allowed. This model is brie￿y derived in Appendix B).
We focus on the impact on unemployment ￿ows, the unemployment rate, and
wage dispersion. Results are reported in Table 2.
We see that the stock of employed job seekers, oj, responds negatively to
a change in k. The elasticity of this stock to the search cost k is -0.51.T h e
23Table 2: Impact of on-the-job search
Base k =0 .15
labour market tightness θ 0.47 0.43
u. workers￿ matching probability θq(θ) 0.41 0.40
unemployed job seekers u 0.088 0.099
employed job seekers oj 0.063 0.047
vacancies v 0.092 0.078
unemployment in￿ow Ui 0.040 0.043
average productivity (￿lled jobs) avge 1.28 1.28
ratio highest to lowest wage wmax/wmin 1.811 .66
std dev of wages (￿lled jobs) 0.094 0.080
Ar i s ei nk reduces employed job search
expected surplus from on-the-job search is lower when we increase job search
costs (k), so the wage paid to these employed job seekers is higher than when
k was low (in the base case). As a consequence the job destruction threshold
rises, leading to an increase of the unemployment in￿ow rate. The elasticity
of the unemployment in￿ow rate to employed job search costs is 0.15. The de-
crease in the number of employed job seekers has a small and negative impact on
θq(θ) - the elasticity of the unemployment out￿ow rate to employed job search
costs equals 0.05, three times smaller than the elasticity of the unemployment
in￿ow rate to k. Employed job seekers generate more vacancies in the market,
￿rstly because most jobs quit from are re-advertised, secondly because, their
presence lowers the job creation threshold, as detailed above. They also cre-
ate competition for the unemployed for vacancies. The former eﬀect is slightly
stronger, so overall there is a negative impact of less employed job search on
the unemployed searchers￿ chances to ￿nd a job. The impact of less on-the job
search on the unemployment in￿ow and out￿ow rates both lead to a higher un-
employment rate. The size of unemployment ￿ows, or unemployment turnover
24(UF = Ui.(1−u)=θq(θ)u) is higher when there is less on-the job (UF =0 .036
i nt h eb a s ec a s ea n dUF =0 .040 when k =0 .15) although the out￿ow rate is
(slightly) lower.
This diﬀers from the results of Boeri (1999), who observes that countries with
a high fraction of employed job search exhibit lower unemployment turnover
rates. Pissarides (2000), however, ￿nds no congestion eﬀect from increased
on-the-job search. In his model, lower search costs for the employed leads to
more employed job search and more job creation. The net eﬀect on tightness
is positive (i.e. a less congested labour market on the workers￿ side) as in our
framework. In his model, job destruction decreases too, so the overall eﬀect on
unemployment is a decrease as in our setting. In both models, a decrease in
the search costs for the employed leads to an ambiguous shift of the Beveridge
curve (see results in Table ??). Fuentes (2002) ￿nds empirically that more on-
the-job search shifts the Beveridge curve out, with data on British regions over
the period 1979-1993.
Another consequence of increased on-the-job search is an increase in wage
dispersion. More on-the-job search leads to a lower job creation threshold, so
a wider range of viable idiosyncratic productivities21.A l s o ,t h ew a g er a t ep a i d
to employed job seekers is lower than the wage paid to employed workers who
do not engage in search, so this combines with the previous eﬀect to increase
wage dispersion. With no on-the-job search, the wage rate attached to the
highest viable idiosyncratic productivity is 22% higher than the wage attached
21The average productivity is not aﬀected however (see last line of the table) because,
although more job survive when on-the-job search is allowed (R is lower), the density of the
distribution of   in ￿lled jobs is lower on the interval (T;S) than on the interval (S;σ) as jobs
are quit at a higher rate on the former interval than on the latter.
25to the lowest viable productivity. When on-the-job search is allowed (as in our
base case), the highest wage rate is 81% above the lowest wage. The standard
deviation of wages increases from 0.055 to 0.094 when we allow on-the-job search
compared to when we do not. When employed job search is decreased through
higher search costs (k =0 .15 column), the ratio of maximum to minimum wage
drops to 1.66 and the standard deviation of wages to 0.08. This result supports
a recent literature that regards on-the job search as an important source of wage
dispersion (Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg
(1999), Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno, 2003).We argue (see above, section 2.3)
that the extent of ojs and the degree of wage dispersion are in fact mutually
reinforcing.
3.3 Employed job search and the Transmission of Business
Cycle shifts
This section shows how shifts in the business cycle are transmitted to labour
outcomes in our model. These results highlight the crucial role of on-the-job
search in the cyclical dynamics of the labour market. The sensitivity of both
unemployment ￿ow rates, the unemployment rate, and the wage dispersion to
the state of the business cylce is greatly aﬀected by the presence of on-the-job
s e a r c ha n di t so w ns e n s i t i v i t yt ot h ec y c l e .
We look at the impact of a change in the aggregate price component p by
comparing steady-states for diﬀerent values of p, embodying once-and-for-all
unanticipated shocks to the aggregate activity22. Results are shown Table 3.
22This comparative statics exercise is less informative than a dynamic simulation of a sto-
chastic version of the model, as in Pissarides (2000) or Shimer (2003a, p.14), but the greater
c o m p l e x i t yo fo u rm o d e lm e a n st h a tt h i si sn o tf e a s i b l e .
26Table 3: Impact of business cycle and on-the-job search





Lab. market tightness θ 0.47 0.68 0.36 0.50
U. out￿ow rate θq(θ) 0.41 0.50 0.36 0.43
Unemployed job seekers u 0.088 0.050 0.147 0.124
Employed job seekers oj 0.063 0.070 0 0
Vacancies v 0.092 0.116 0.052 0.062
U. in￿ow rate Ui 0.040 0.026 0.062 0.060
Avge prod. (￿lled jobs) avge 1.2811 .370 1.287 1.379
Rto highest to lowest wage wmax/wmin 1.81 2.27 1.22 1.23
Std dev wages (￿lled jobs) 0.094 0.130 0.055 0.063
A higher value of p simulates a boom.
First, note that labour market tightness θ, the workers￿ matching probability
θq(θ), and the stock of vacancies v are procyclical while the vacancies￿ matching
probability q(θ), the stock of unemployment u and the unemployment in￿ow rate
La are countercyclical. This con￿rms the model￿s congruence with basic labour
market facts. The stock of employed job searchers is pro-cyclical with a concave
relationship between p and oj23. The quit rate, as the product of oj and the
matching probability θq(θ) (and a) will be super-procyclical, as observed in
data24.
We are interested in how the presence of employed job search in￿uences the
nature of unemployment. The last two columns of Table ?? show the results
when there is no employed job search. Comparing these with results with em-
p l o y e dj o bs e a r c hs h o w sh o we m p l o y e dj o bs e a r c ha ﬀects the cyclical sensitivity
of unemployment ￿ow rates. With no employed job search the elasticity of the
unemployment in￿ow rate with respect to p is -0.3 (instead of -3.4 with em-
23The concavity of this relationship is observed when running simulations for several values
of p (results unreported here).
24See for example, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) or Boeri (1999).
27ployed job search) and the elasticity of the workers￿ matching probability θq(θ)
with respect to p is 2.1 (instead of 2.3 with employed job search). So we see
that the presence of employed job search renders the unemployment in￿ow rate
more sensitive to the cycle, but it does not substantially aﬀect the cyclical sen-
sitivity of the out￿ow rate. The intuition for this in our model is that changes
in the in￿ow rate are accentuated by the response of employed job search to the
cycle, which in turn has a substantial eﬀect on the in￿ow rate reinforcing the
cyclical eﬀect. As we saw in section 3.2, on-the-job search does not aﬀect the
unemployment out￿ow rate much (but also in the same direction as the cycle),
which explains the small diﬀerence in the out￿ow cyclical sensitivity between
the two models.
With employed job search, business cycle shocks will appear disproportion-
ately as shocks to the in￿ow rate. This ￿ts well with the results of Burgess and
Turon (2005) for Britain. The implication of this is that unemployment dynam-
ics, and in particular the nature of the transmission of business cycle shocks to
unemployment, depends on on-the-job search. For example, international dif-
ferences in unemployment dynamics (see for example Balmaseda, Dolado and
Lopez-Salido, 2000, or Balakrishnan and Michelacci, 2001) may arise from dif-
ferences in on-the-job search, as well as other (institutional) diﬀerences.
The stock of vacancies v is procyclical and has an elasticity of 3.1 with
respect to p, while the stock of unemployment u is countercyclical and exhibits
an elasticity of -5.5 with respect to p. With no employed job search these
numbers are 2.1 and -2.0 respectively. This yields the well-known negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle - the
28Beveridge curve. Note that with employed job search, the U/V ratio is far more
cyclically sensitive than in the standard set-up with this. This relates closely to
Shimer￿s (2005) critique of standard search and matching models - an issue we
pursue in another paper.
With employed job search, we also observe that the stock of vacancies is more
cyclically sensitive than the unemployment out￿ow rate θq(θ) (the respective
elasticities are 3.1 and 2.3). This is explained by the fact that, when there are
more vacancies around, more employed workers engage in job search attracted by
these increased opportunities and they crowd out unemployed workers although
their presence has a net positive impact on the unemployed matching rate. The
increase in matching probability for the workers is hence less than it would have
been without employed job search. The creation of new vacancies to be posted
when they quit their jobs more than oﬀsets the crowding out to yield a slightly
pro-cyclical out￿ow rate.
Wage dispersion increases in booms and, as we saw in the previous section,
with on-the-job search. With employed job search, its cyclical sensitivity is
much higher than without employed job search (respective elasticities of the
standard deviation of wages with respect to p are 3.8 and 1.5), because of the
response of the number of employed job seekers to changes in p.
3.4 Job ￿ows and worker ￿ows
One of the key points of our model, and unlike other search and matching
models, is that job ￿ows and worker ￿ows do not coincide. Not all the jobs
destroyed incur layoﬀs because some workers either leave the labour force or
take another job. Job creation and unemployment out￿ows do not coincide as
29some new jobs (about half of them) are taken by employed job searchers. Job-
to-job moves give rise to new vacancies and new hires, but without job creation
when the ￿rm decides to replace those workers who quit. Unemployment in￿ows
include not only layoﬀs but also entries into the labour force. We present in
Table 4 some measures of job ￿ows and worker ￿ows in the base case (p =1 ),
in a recession (p =0 .9)a n di nab o o m( p =1 .1).
We de￿ne the various job and worker ￿ows in the following way:
Job ￿ows: JF = λ.F(R).e (21)
Job-to-job ￿ows: JJF = aθq(θ).oj (22)
Unemployment ￿ows: UF =( λ.F(R)+l).e = θq(θ).u (23)
Labour force ￿ows: LF = l.e (24)
Worker ￿ows : WF = UF + JJF = JF + LF + JJF (25)
Table 4: Job ￿ows and worker ￿ows
p =1 p =1 .1
Job ￿ows 0.0180 . 0 0 6
U ￿ows 0.036 0.025
L ￿ows 0.0180 . 0 19
JJ ￿ows 0.044 0.060
Worker ￿ows 0.080 0.085
JF / WF 0.23 0.07
UF / JF 2.00 4.17
A higher value of p simulates a boom.
Table 4 shows that our model produces countercyclical unemployment ￿ows,
consistent with the data presented by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for four Eu-
ropean countries. Job ￿ows are also countercyclical25, whereas worker ￿ows
25Many studies have found evidence of countercyclical job ￿ows (see for example Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) or Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000)). Boeri (1996) however questions
30are procyclical. The ratios between these ￿ows show that unemployment ￿ows,
worker ￿ows and job ￿ows have very diﬀerent cyclical behaviour. As noted,
job destruction does not coincide with separations, i.e. worker ￿ows. Indeed,
the ratio between the two not only is much smaller than 1, but is very sensi-
tive to the business cycle. We argue that standard search and matching models
which cannot distinguish job and worker ￿o w sm i s sas i g n i ￿cant aspect of labour
market dynamics.
Our understanding of the diﬀerence between worker ￿ows and job ￿ows,
driven by job-to-job ￿ows and labour force ￿o w s ,s e e m st ou si m p o r t a n ti nt h e
analysis of unemployment dynamics as it aﬀects both the level and the cyclical
behaviour of the unemployment rate and ￿ows. Researchers have come to see
worker ￿ows and job ￿ows as key elements of the operation of labour markets.
This model is the ￿rst in the now ubiquitous matching approach to be able to
analyse them separately.
Contini and Revelli (1997, Table 6, p. 258) report gross worker turnover
￿gures to be between 2.5 to 3.9 larger than job turnover ￿gures for France,
Germany, the US, Canada and Italy. Lane, Stevens and Burgess (1996) ￿nd
that worker reallocation is two to three times greater than job reallocation with
data for Maryland. Our model predicts the ratio of worker to job ￿ows to vary
between 5.5 and 17 over the cycle.
3.5 Impact of search parameters
In this section, we turn to consider the impact of two model parameters of
interest in this environment: the level of unemployment bene￿t b, is relevant
this ￿nding.
31to policy analysis, and the ranking parameter, a,i n ￿uences the competition
between employed and unemployed searchers. Results are shown in Table 5 for
t h eb a s ec a s e ,f o ra n13% increase in the unemployment income, to 0.9, and for
a 17% increase in the relative eﬃciency of employed job seekers, to 2.
Table 5: Impact of unemployment bene￿t, worker￿s share and variance of idio-
syncratic productivity
Base b =0 .9 a =2
market tightness θ 0.47 0.26 0.49
Uo u t ￿ow rate θq(θ) 0.41 0.31 0.42
unemployed job seekers u 0.088 0.147 0.076
employed job seekers oj 0.063 0.045 0.064
vacancies v 0.092 0.059 0.101
Ui n ￿ow rate Ui 0.040 0.053 0.035
avge prod. (￿lled jobs) avge 1.2811 .295 1.280
rto highest to lowest wage wmax/wmin 1.811 .385
std dev wages (￿lled jobs) 0.094 0.059
Base has b =0 .8,a n da =1 .71
An increase in the unemployment income b leads to an increase in u and
a decrease in θq(θ) a sp r e d i c t e db yu n e m p l o y e dj o bs e a r c ht h e o r y . I nt h i s
model, an increase in b also has a large impact on the job destruction rate. In
the wage bargaining, the workers￿ outside option, U,i sw o r t hm o r ew h e nb is
higher, so the negotiated wage rate will be higher. The consequence is that
some jobs with low idiosyncratic productivity   will no longer be pro￿table. In
other words, the job creation threshold T will be higher and less vacancies will
be advertised. For the same reason, the job destruction threshold R will be
higher, so the probability that the idiosyncratic productivity falls below that
threshold after a shock will be higher, hence the higher job destruction rate.
A consequence of this is that the average productivity is positively correlated
32with unemployment bene￿t, as in den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001,p . 2 1).
We also ￿nd that an increase in unemployment bene￿t reduces wage inequality.
When b equals 0.9, the maximum wage exceeds the minimum wage by only 39%
(and the wage standard deviation in ￿l l e dj o b si s0 . 0 6 ) ,a so p p o s e dt o8 1%( a n d
the wage standard deviation in ￿lled jobs is 0.09), when b equals 0.8. These
a r es i z e a b l ee ﬀects. The intuition is that wages over the range (R;S) of the
distribution, where on-the-job search occurs, are raised much more (by about
0.09 in our simulation) than wages over the range (S;T), where no on-the-job
search occurs, (virtually unchanged in our simulation). A sketch explanation
for this diﬀerential is provided in Appendix C.
The results also show that the impact of an increase in unemployment bene￿t
is greater on the unemployment in￿ow (with an elasticity of -2.6) than on the
out￿ow rate (with an elasticity of -2.0). Part of this equilibrium outcome works
through lower employed job search: as the matching probability is lower and
the variance of job opportunities is lower, employed job search is much less
attractive: the elasticity of oj with respect to b is -2.3.
There is a large literature on the impact of unemployment bene￿t on unem-
ployment. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) review this literature and report
a range of estimates for the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
unemployment duration of 0.2 to 0.9. Our results yield a higher elasticity of 2.0.
Our model, however, predicts a general equilibrium eﬀect of unemployment ben-
e￿t on unemployment. With cross-country data for the OECD, Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991) ￿nd an elasticity of unemployment with respect to unem-
ployment insurance replacement ratio of around one. With our calibrated value
33of b, the average replacement ratio over ￿lled jobs in the base case is 75%. The
elasticity of the unemployment stock with respect to replacement ratio predicted
by our model is 6.0. Costain and Reiter (2003) argue that standard job matching
models cannot be calibrated so as to match both the long-run response of unem-
ployment to unemployment bene￿t and the business-cycle frequency volatility
of unemployment. They show that introducing embodied technological change
or sticky wages improve the model￿s ability to match both types of stylised facts.
An increase in the parameter a, which represents an increase in the extent
of ranking between employed and unemployed job seekers, leads to lower un-
employment and a virtually identical unemployment turnover rate. This seems
counter-intuitive and is worth spending some time on. A higher value of a
encourages more employed job search, and so leads to a higher quit rate and
hence more vacancies. It also leads to a lower job destruction threshold and
hence lower unemployment in￿ow rate. In this sense it functions like a fall in
the cost of employed job search, which as noted above, reduces unemployment.
This eﬀect cancels out the obvious direct impact on the chances of unemployed
searchers from a greater disproportionate chance for employed searchers, so that
the out￿ow rate is unchanged. The lower unemployment in￿ow rate reduces un-
employment.
Kugler and Saint Paul (2003) and Eriksson and Gottfries (2002) ￿nd that
more ranking leads to a higher and more stagnant unemployment. However,
these models are very diﬀerent to the one set out here - Kugler and Saint Paul￿s
model is based on adverse selection whereas we have identical workers, and
Eriksson and Gottfries is not a matching model.
344C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses the search and matching framework to explore the role of em-
ployed job search in the labour market. With our model, we can analyse its
impact in terms of unemployment level and dynamics, job creation and job
destruction, hires and separations. The speci￿c features of the model are en-
dogenous employed job search, ￿ows in and out of the labour force, endogenous
job destruction and heterogeneous job creation. In our model, job ￿ows and
workers ￿ows do not coincide as we allow for job-to-job ￿ows, ￿rms￿ churning
of workers and labour force entries and exits. Employed job search has a sub-
stantial impact on unemployment dynamics. More on-the-job search leads to a
lower unemployment in￿ow rate and a marginally higher out￿ow rate. The sen-
sitivity of the labour market to the business cycle is aﬀected too: with employed
job search, the stock of vacancies is more cyclically sensitive and the unemploy-
ment in￿ow rate more cyclically sensitive than without employed job search.
The cyclical sensitivity of the unemployment out￿ow rate is not substantially
aﬀected. One consequence is that most unemployment dynamics arise through
the in￿ow response to cyclical shocks.
Researchers have come to see worker ￿ows and job ￿ows as key elements
of the operation of labour markets. This model is the ￿rst in the now ubiqui-
tous matching approach to be able to analyse them separately. Other matching
models either allow no employed job search and so no job-to-job ￿ows, or make
a s s u m p t i o n si m p l y i n gn ow o r k e rc h u r n i n g￿b o t ho ft h e s er o u t e sy i e l dt h er e -
sult that worker and job ￿ows are identical. This stands in stark contrast to
35the facts assembled over recent years using microdata on ￿rms, on workers and
using linked ￿rm-worker data. The facts show that worker ￿ows and job ￿ows
are very diﬀerent in magnitude, and also very diﬀerent in terms of their cyclical
behaviour. It is clearly important for the workhorse model of labour market
analysis to be able to accommodate these facts, and this is what the model in
this paper accomplishes. We suggest that the role of employed job search is po-
tentially important in understanding the diﬀerences in labour markets between
diﬀerent countries. For example, an economy where employed job search was
cheap and easy would show experience a low unemployment rate, high wage dis-
persion, high worker ￿ows, and a high ratio of worker to job ￿ows. Conversely,
an economy with costly employed job search would see higher unemployment,
lower wage dispersion and lower worker ￿ow rates. Arguably these are rea-
sonable caricatures of the US and Europe; whilst clearly other factors are also
involved, our analysis suggests there may be a role for employed job search in
understanding these diﬀerences.
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The expression of the surplus is diﬀerent over the three ranges of values of  .
Over the interval (R;T), the value of a vacancy is zero. We have (adding up (4)
(1) and (3), and substituting E − U by βS from (11)):




















where ζ1 = l + r + aθq (θ)+λ.
Over (T;S), vacancies are viable and are determined by (6). So the expres-
sion of the surplus becomes (substituting J − V by (1 − β)S from (11)):


















where ζ2 = l + r + aθq (θ)+λ + q(θ)(1− β).
Over (S;σ), we use (7), (5), (2) and (3):


















where ζ3 = l + r + λ + q(θ)(1− β).
We need an expression for
R σ





V (x)dF (x)=( r + λ)Vi ( )+c − q(θ)(1− β)Si ( ) (A.7)
37Integrating over (T;σ) and solving for
R σ













where F =1− F. Also, integrating by parts, we have:
Z σ
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Using (A.1), (A.8), (A.12) and (A.11), the job destruction condition (19) be-
comes:
[q(θ)(1− β) − θq(θ)(a − 1)β]
T − R
ζ1






























































Equations (A.13), (A.14) and (A.16) give us the thresholds R, T and S as
functions of the tightness and the density functions F and FV .W e c o n s i d e r
F as the exogenous distribution of idiosyncratic productivities of new potential
￿job ideas￿ and of idiosyncratic productivities after shocks. FV (respectively
FE) is the distribution of   over vacant (respectively ￿lled) jobs. These two
distributions are endogenously determined by the model. In steady-state, the
equality between ￿ows in and out of ￿lled jobs over the diﬀerent ranges of




l + aθq (θ)+λ





[(l + aθq (θ)+λ)(FE ( ) − FE (T)) − λ(F ( ) − F (T))]
(A.18)
Over (S;σ):
1 − FV ( )=
1 − u
q(θ)v
[l + λF ( ) − FE ( )(l + λ)] (A.19)
The equality between ￿ows in and out of vacant jobs over the diﬀerent ranges





[(l + aθq (θ))(FE ( ) − FE (T))e +( jcr+ λ.v)(F ( ) − F (T))]
(A.20)
Over (S;σ):
1 − FV ( )=
1
(q(θ)+λ)v
[l(1 − FE ( ))e +( jcr+ λ.v)(1− F ( ))] (A.21)
Taking (A.17) at   = T:
FE (T)=
λ
l + aθq (θ)+λ
(F (T) − F (R)) (A.22)





(l + aθq (θ)+λ)(FE (S) − FE (T))
−λ(F (S) − F (T))
‚
(A.23)
1 − FV (S)=
1 − u
q(θ)v
[l + λF (S) − FE (S)(l + λ)] (A.24)





(l + aθq (θ))(FE (S) − FE (T))e
+(jcr+ λ.v)(F (S) − F (T))
‚
(A.25)




l(1 − FE (S))e
+(jcr+ λ.v)(1− F (S))
‚
(A.26)
Rearranging (A.22) to (A.26) and using (17), we solve for FE (T), FE (S),
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(l + aθq (θ))(FE (S) − FE (T))(1 − u)











(l + aθq (θ)FE (S) − FE (T)(l + aθq (θ)))(1 − u)
+(jcr+ λ.v)(1− F (T))
‚
(A.31)
The stock of employed job seekers is given by:
oj = FE (S)(1− u) (A.32)
The labour market tightness (and hence θq(θ) and q(θ)) is then obtained with
(14). The distribution function FV (.) is then given by (A.20) and (A.21)a n d
allows us to solve the three conditions (A.13), (A.14) and (A.16).
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We brie￿y derive here the model without on-the-job search.





















3 = l + r + λ + q(θ)(1− β) (B.2)
ζ
n
3 = l + r + λ (B.3)




































The equality between ￿ows in and out of vacant jobs and ￿lled over the diﬀerent














[l(FE ( ) − FE (T)).e +( jcr+ λ.v)(F ( ) − F (T))] (B.7)
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This appendix gives a sketch of explanation as to why wages of employed job
seekers are much more aﬀected by a change in the surplus, caused for example
by a change in the unemployment bene￿t, than wages of employed individuals
who do not search. From the Bellman equations (2) and (1), we have:




r + l + aθq(θ)+λ
(C.1)




r + l + λ
(C.2)
With the parameter values of our base case, this means that to induce a given
change in the worker￿s side of the surplus the wage of employed job seekers needs
to adjust by
r+l+aθq(θ)+λ
r+l+λ =4 .6 times as much as the wage of individuals who
do not search. Hence, following a rise in unemployment bene￿t, as in section
3.5, wages in the range (R;S), i.e.in the bottom of the wage distribution, where
employed individuals search on the job, exhibit a much larger rise than wages in
the rest of the wage distribution, where employed workers do not search. This
then leads to a compression of the wage distribution, reinforced by the fact that
the range of viable productivities is narrower when the unemployment income
is raised.
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